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This thesis examines the impact of NATO-Russia relations on the process 
of military reform in the Russian Federation. The military reform process within 
Russia that aims to create a lean, professional military that Russia can afford and 
that will better serve Moscow’s defense needs is hampered by a lingering 
perception of a threat from the United States and NATO, despite significant 
evidence to the contrary.  A reformed military would reduce the burden on 
Russia’s economy and would be better matched to the immediate and future 
security needs of the Russian state.  A cooperative relationship between Moscow 
and the West could help to ease the perception of a threat posed by NATO. This 
could encourage the creation of a Russian military capable of joint operations 
with Western militaries, especially in the realm of counter-terrorism and 
peacekeeping operations. A military reformed along these lines could serve as a 
cornerstone for a strengthened Russian democracy that would allow Russia to 
become, once again, a player on the world stage. A willingness by NATO and the 
United States to pursue increased military and political cooperation with Moscow 
offers an opportunity to influence positively the military reform process within 
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 Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, a portion of the military and 
political leadership in Russia began to recognize the need for a dramatic 
reformation of the Russian military.  Russia’s huge military structure, based on a 
massive system of conscription and an approach to military superiority through 
quantity rather than quality, placed an excessive economic and social burden on 
Russia.  These would-be reformers failed to gain support for their efforts to 
reverse this trend, which ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  Resistance to reform continued throughout the 1990’s as Russia’s 
economic and social conditions continued to decline.  While a confrontation with 
the North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO) became a remote possibility, a 
fixation upon the supposed threat posed by Alliance persisted within the Russian 
military leadership.   The military has grudgingly begun an effort to reform, but 
thus far it has failed to achieve the dramatic changes that advocates of military 
reform insist are needed. 
The military reform process within Russia that aims to create a lean, 
professional military that Russia can afford and that will better serve Moscow’s 
defense needs is hampered by a lingering perception of a threat from the United 
States and NATO, despite significant evidence to the contrary.  While the 
unreformed Russia military denies Moscow a coercive tool and, in the short term, 
has offered the United States and NATO greater latitude for action, a reformed 
Russian military is in the long-term interests of Russia as well as of NATO and 
the United States. A reformed military would reduce the burden on Russia’s 
economy and would be better matched to the immediate and future security 
needs of the Russian state.  A cooperative relationship between Moscow and the 
West would help to ease the perception of a threat posed by NATO. This could 
encourage the creation of a Russian military capable of joint operations with 
Western militaries, especially in the realm of counter-terrorism and peacekeeping 
operations. A military reformed along these lines could serve as a cornerstone for 
a strengthened Russian democracy that would allow Russia to become, once 
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again, a player on the world stage. A willingness by NATO and the United States 
to pursue increased military and political cooperation with Moscow offers an 
opportunity to influence positively the military reform process within Russia.  
In the last decade, NATO and the United States have struggled to create a 
new relationship with Moscow. Cooperation between NATO and Russia has 
been made difficult by the Alliance’s enlargement and by U.S.-inspired initiatives 
perceived in Russia to have been crafted as opportunist reactions to Russia’s 
weakened political, economic, and military position.  Today, much of Russia’s 
hostility to NATO has been submerged. But concern over the expansion of NATO 
into the Baltic, Russia’s desire to influence NATO’s decision making process, and 
the future shape of relations between Moscow and the Alliance remain significant 
sources of tension.  This uneasiness surrounding the relationship with the United 
States and NATO fuels opposition to the military reform process in Russia, giving 
its opponents the justification they require as they struggle to maintain a large 
military structure oriented against a Euro-Atlantic threat. This inhibits force 
rationalization and modernization, and places the Russian military in a poor 
posture to deal with more salient threats on Russia’s periphery. 
While the unreformed military has left Moscow in a weakened position, 
allowing the United States and NATO greater degree of freedom in the 
international arena, a reformed Russian military, working in cooperation with 
Alliance, could reduce the existing burden of maintaining a stable security 
environment.  The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 
September 2001 and the subsequent US-led effort in Afghanistan highlight the 
growing threat to global security emerging in Central Asia.  Because the Russian 
military currently lacks the capability to maintain security in Central Asia, the 
United States and its allies have been forced to intervene there, further stretching 
limited military resources. Russian performance in Chechnya demonstrates that 
any effort by Moscow to act would have the effect of a blunt instrument that 
discredits the whole anti-terrorist effort by its brutality.  Likewise, the unreformed 
Russian military continues to place an excessive burden on the Russian 
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economy and society that threatens to have larger economic and political 
implications for a vast state still in the process of democratization.  A reformed 
Russian military, combined with strengthened ties between Moscow, the United 
States, and NATO, would lessen these problems. 
The election of President Vladimir Putin in March 2000 marked a 
significant change in Moscow’s domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, Putin 
moved quickly to consolidate presidential power in the Russian government.  He 
discarded President Yeltsin’s rhetoric, which claimed that despite appearance, 
the economic and social situation in Russia was improving.1  In his first State of 
the Russian Federation address in July 2000, he warned that the military reform 
process was not working and that Russia faced economic catastrophe; that “the 
very survival of the nation” was at stake unless drastic action is taken.2  
Accompanying this recognition of Russia’s domestic situation was a realization 
that adversarial relations with the West undermined prospects for economic 
recovery.  Moscow’s dependence on aid from the West, including contributions 
from many NATO members, made maintaining good relations with Russia’s 
former adversaries a high priority.  As a result, Putin began to adopt a more 
accommodating and cooperative foreign policy approach in Russia’s dealings 
with NATO. 
Putin’s policy changes face considerable opposition from the political and 
military elite within Russia, who see NATO as a threat to Russian influence in 
Europe and an organization that might seek to intrude on what they see as 
Moscow’s sphere of influence. NATO’s actions in Kosovo and the continued 
efforts toward a second round of enlargement provided the military with a 
potential threat that can be used to justify resistance to reform and offers political 
hardliners a target for anti-Western rhetoric.  Thus far, however, Putin’s 
                                                 
1 Vladimir Baranovsky. “NATO Enlargement: Russia’s Attitudes.” IISS/CEPS European Security 
Forum, (Brussels, 9 July 2001. http://www.eusec.org/baranovsky.htm. 10 August 2002.) 
 
2 Eugene Huskey.  “Overcoming the Yeltsin Legacy: Vladimir Putin and Russian Political Reform” 





popularity with the Russian people has allowed him to exercise a greater degree 
of personal control over foreign policy despite this opposition.3  However, with no 
obvious successor to Putin who will continue his more cooperative approach with 
the West, and with his own declaration that he will not serve more than two terms 
in office, it is very possible that Moscow’s policies could change dramatically after 
the end of his time in office.  
The Russian President’s attitude toward the West and his influence in the 
government have led to a more general acceptance of NATO’s continued growth 
as the leading security organization in Europe.  While Russia would still prefer 
that NATO action be taken in accordance with decisions by the UN Security 
Council or the OSCE, rather than unilateral actions such as the Kosovo 
campaign, it was quick to offer support for the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, 
including the basing of troops from various NATO countries in former Soviet 
republics.  This is a level of cooperation considered unthinkable just three years 
before when Russia effectively walked out of the Permanent Joint Council that it 
had established with NATO in 1997.  While some issues remain, this new attitude 
toward the Alliance has included a greater willingness to compromise on the 
subject of NATO enlargement.  Putin summarized his position in a statement 
made in November 2001: "Russia will have as close a relationship with NATO as 
the alliance is ready to have with us."4  In doing so, President Putin appeared to 
place the burden of deciding the future course of NATO-Russian relations 
squarely on the shoulders of the Alliance and the United States in particular.  
Recent disagreements with the United States over a potential military action 
                                                 
3 For example, “With an approval rating of around 75%… Putin has a strong popular mandate 
that has so far allowed him to ignore grumbling within Russia's conservative military 
establishment and complaints that Russia has given too much and received too little from its 
support for the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism, ” in House, Karen Elliot and Andrew Higgins. 
“Putin Says Bush Shouldn't Go It Alone When Deciding How to Deal with Iraq””, Wall Street 
Journal, (2 February 2002, http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/021102Journal.shtml, 29 October 
2002). 
 
4 Pavel Felgenhauer. “Putin Serious About NATO,” in Moscow Times from Center for Defense 





against Iraq demonstrates that Moscow may back away from this cooperative 
posture if Russian interests are marginalized.   
Chapter II outlines the recent history of the military reform process in 
Russia, particularly the growing ineffectiveness of the conscript-based force, the 
fiscal realities of the Russian economy, and the effort to restructure the military to 
deal with a wider variety of threats.  It details the difficulty that Russia has 
experienced in initiating a meaningful reform effort and the frequent opposition to 
reform by the military leadership.  The powerful influence of these top officers, 
combined with the limited civilian oversight of the armed forces, allows the 
perpetuation of a military system that is inconsistent with the needs of the 
Russian state and the realities of Russia’s current strategic situation.  
Chapter III examines the reasons for Russia’s continued preoccupation 
with NATO and the United States as threats to its security.  The evolution of 
NATO’s relationship with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union is 
discussed, including the impact of NATO’s expansion effort and the reaction to 
the Kosovo conflict on Russia’s threat perceptions and strategic outlook.  It 
explores the influence this westward defense orientation has on Russian military 
doctrine, national security policy, and armed forces structure.  An analysis of 
existing and emerging threats Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Far East 
demonstrates the weakness in the continued antagonistic perception of NATO 
and the United States, which acts as an obstacle to military reform needed to 
meet Russia’s security challenges in these other regions.   
Chapter IV explores the implications of recent agreements between 
Russia, the United States, and NATO on process of military reform in Russia.   
Particular attention will be paid to the cooperation between the Unites States and 
Russia that has emerged since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and 
the NATO-Russia Council established by the “NATO at Twenty” agreements in 
early 2002, as well as the personal influence of Russian President Vladimir Putin.    
This cooperative relationship reduces threat perceptions and creates an external 
environment that promotes the process of military reform in Russia.  The existing 
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and potential obstacles to maintaining and strengthening this cooperative 
relationship will be discussed. 
Chapter V offers conclusions, provides policy recommendations on how 
the process of reform might be encouraged by external American and NATO 
influence, and offers some predictions for the future of military reform if a more 
cooperative environment can be maintained.  
 6 
 
II. STATUS OF RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM 
 
The issue of Russian military reform extends beyond the relatively simple 
issue of creating a force structure to match threats to security and economic 
realities.  The legacy of the Soviet state infrastructure, geared toward the 
principal purpose of maintaining a massive military mobilization base, and with it 
a rigid command economy, remains a tremendous obstacle to the process of 
democratization and economic growth.  Russia’s transition to a consolidated 
democracy is far from complete, and the strong political, economic, and social 
position occupied by Russia’s unreformed military will continue to have a 
negative impact on this transition.  Likewise, Russia’s status as a major regional 
power, even in its weakened condition, makes it an important factor in 
maintaining a stable security environment in Eurasia. Considering these 
relationships, and NATO’s stated goals of promoting the growth of democratic 
institutions and the creation of a stable collective security environment, the 
course that the military reform process takes in Russia is extremely relevant to 
the Alliance.5  An examination of the troubled history of Russian military reform 
illustrates a continued preoccupation with a Cold War military structure and a 
defense posture oriented against the West, despite growing evidence that such a 
military is neither required nor affordable.  
The Russian concept of military reform is very distinct from the more 
strictly defined transformation and restructuring of those military forces 
subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Military reform, as a broader 
definition, applies to both the Russian military and paramilitary organizations and 
encompasses the “political, economic, and social questions attached to raising, 
sustaining, training, arming, deploying, and employing a military as an element of 
                                                 
5 The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Washington: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (23 




Russian national power.”6 This broader definition extends to the capacity of the 
Russian economy to support a defense structure appropriate to the threats it 
faces in the present international system and the recognition of Russia’s standing 
within that system.    
A. ORIGIN OF THE REFORM DEBATE 
 The military reform process first emerged in the late 1980’s with 
Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost.   The relaxation of state control on the media 
allowed a public discussion on Moscow television in 1988, which presented the 
possibility of a small volunteer military replacing the existing conscript force and 
system of territorial militias.  This ignited a wider debate within the media, as 
journalists, scholars and officers took sides in opposition to or support of a 
professional military.7    Two separate government commissions were formed in 
1989-90 to investigate the possibility of military reform; one under the leadership 
of the Ministry of Defense and the other -- the Commission for the Preparation 
and Implementation of Military Reform in the USSR -- under the direction of the 
Supreme Soviet subcommittee on the armed forces.8  In his book, The Collapse 
of the Soviet Military, Yale University Professor and retired General William 
Odom provides a concise account of the contending positions established by 
these two commissions, in a debate over military reform that continues today.  
 The Commission for the Preparation and Implementation of Military 
Reform, under the leadership of Major Vladimir Lopatin, proposed a radical 
reform agenda that would transform the existing Soviet Military in a number of 
areas. The commission organized by the General Staff and the Ministry of 
                                                 
6 Dr. Jacob W. Kipp. Russian Military Reform: Status and Prospects (Views of a Western Military 
Historian). (Fort Leavenworth:  Foreign Military Studies Office, 1998. 
http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/rusrform.htm. 14 October 2002.) 
 
7 William E. Odom. The Collapse of the Soviet Military. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1998), p. 187. 
 




Defense opposed many of Lopatin’s reform ideas.  The underlying goal of 
Lopatin’s proposals was the reduction of the burdens imposed on the Russian 
economy by the large Soviet military and defense industry.  Proponents of reform 
focused their arguments on a revised assessment of threats faced by the military 
and a desire to improve performance, morale and quality within the forces.  
Lopatin’s commission proposed a gradual transition to a small, all-volunteer, 
professional army, with a focus four principle issues: elimination of conscription, 
establishment of civilian control over the military, realistic threat assessment, and 
budget cuts.9 
The use of conscription in the Soviet military was to be reduced, and 
eventually eliminated. The living conditions and social support for enlisted men 
was also to be improved.  The low quality of life of the average conscript made 
military service extremely unattractive.  The conscript system drew sharp 
criticism from various segments of Soviet society, including the governments of 
several republics, which desired their own national military formations and 
disliked the practice of sending conscripts from their regions to perform military 
service under brutal conditions in distant corners of the Soviet Union.10  
Brutal treatment of soldiers and dismal living conditions, which made the 
conscript system so unpopular, would make the adoption of a volunteer military 
virtually impossible to realize in the absence of reform.  The abuse of new 
recruits by older conscripts, dovshchina, had become a tremendous problem in 
the late Soviet era.  While the military “claimed that the situation [was] under 
control,” the reality was that violence within the armed forces ranks achieved 
horrific levels.11  Statistical data on the scope of the problem is limited, but 
Richard F. Staar, senior fellow at the Hoover Institute, reported that an incredible 
40,000 conscripts died as a result of brutal treatment, suicide, and ethnic gang 
                                                 




11 Eugene B. Rumer. The End of a Monolith: The Politics of Military Reform in the Soviet Armed 




violence within the military from 1985-1990. This exceeded total Soviet losses 
during the war in Afghanistan. 12  Such a high number seems difficult to believe 
by American or European standards, but even if the figure is an overestimate by 
an order of magnitude, it dramatically illustrates the seriousness of the problem.  
Lopatin’s commission also recommended greater civilian control of the 
military.  Parliamentary oversight of the military bureaucracy was to be 
established, opening the military to public scrutiny.  The government and the 
Ministry of Defense would be required to work in conjunction with the legislature 
to establish defense policy.  For such a relationship to exist, the veil of secrecy 
that surrounded the defense establishment would have to be lifted.  In addition, 
the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff were to be clearly divided, with the 
ministry headed by a civilian rather than a military man. 13   These two bodies, 
which enjoyed a high degree of autonomy under the Soviet system, strongly 
opposed such transparency and subservience to civilian authority.  
The commission called for a prioritization in defense spending and a force 
structure based on realistic threat assessments. These assessments should 
coincide with a doctrine of “defensive sufficiency” – e.g. (military power designed 
to provide an adequate defense the state from aggression rather than a coercive 
instrument or symbol of state prestige). The General Staff claimed not to object 
realistic threat assessment, but argued that parliamentary review of military 
threat evaluations would be unworkable as the separate institutions differed on 
what constituted a threat.  The generals tended to view the international 
environment as inherently dangerous, while many of the reformers, including 
Lopatin, saw the existing environment as much less threatening.   The reformers 
suggested that a more cooperative relationship with the West, including the 
                                                 
12 Starr cites three sources to support this figure: “Russia’s Armed Forces,” The Economist, 
(London: 28 August-3 September 1996), pp. 18-19; Stanislav Telegin “Umerla li v armii 
Dedovshchina?” Krasnaia zvezda, (4 July 1995), p. 3; and an interview with Lt. Gen. Stanislav E. 
Gaveto, deputy chief military prosecutor.  Richard F. Starr. The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths 
That Shape the Image. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), p. 65. 
 




principle Cold-War rival, the United States, could have a positive effect on the 
process of reform.14  Such attitudes were met with considerable skepticism within 
the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, who were unwilling to look beyond 
the long-standing bipolarity of the Cold War.  
Finally, the military budget was to be reduced dramatically, which would 
require significant reductions in the size of the military.  The large defense 
bureaucracy was specifically targeted for reduction, as were the large number of 
the highly coveted general officer billets. The bloated and inefficient military 
education and training structure also drew criticism, and the commission 
suggested that it be cut dramatically.  The special privileges associated with 
positions for general officers, resented by officers of lower rank who endured 
substandard living conditions, were also to be curtailed in an effort to reduce 
cost.15  All off these cost cutting measures were not only required to reduce the 
burden on the Russian economy, but also to provide the extra funds needed to 
implement the various military reform measures. 
The draft proposed by Lopatin’s commission failed to gain approval, but it 
heavily influenced the reform plan established by Marshal Yazov, Gorbachev’s 
Minister of Defense, in 1989.  Yazov’s plan called for the removal of civil defense 
troops and construction troops from the authority of the armed forces.  Military 
districts and staff organizations were to be reduced in number, and general 
officer positions slashed by thirty percent.  Thirty to forty percent reductions were 
planned in the military education system.  Yazov agreed to a test program with 
volunteer soldiers under contract to begin sometime in the early 1990’s, but 
refused to give further ground immediately on the issue of abolition of 
conscription.  He emphasized a doctrine that would limit the military to dealing 
with external threats, avoiding a role of intervention in domestic disorders.  
Finally, he called for an increase in expenditures for housing and pensions for 
                                                 






servicemen.  Yazov warned that it would take at least a decade to implement 
many of these changes.16   
Marshal Yazov’s plan was adopted by the Ministry of Defense in 1990, but 
never signed into law by parliament.  It fell short of the reforms envisioned by 
Lopatin’s commission, and ignored three of the most pressing issues: civilian 
control, budget cuts, and realistic threat assessment.  Efforts to implement the 
plan proceeded very slowly and little had been accomplished prior to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  However, the two opposing viewpoints established by 
Yazov and Lopatin would characterize the struggle to overcome military 
resistance to reform for the remainder of the twentieth century. 
B. MILITARY REFORM AFTER THE COLD WAR 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the brief but unsuccessful effort to 
preserve the existing military structure under the newly created Commonwealth 
of Independent States left Russia with few options.  In May 1992, the Russian 
armed forces were established and General Pavel Grachev was installed as the 
first Russian Minister of Defense.  The General Staff under Grachev retained 
much of its former Soviet character, with many general officers remaining in the 
same posts they held under the communist regime. While it was clear that the 
fledgling Russian state with its weak economy could not support the gigantic 
military structure it had inherited from the Soviet Union, this group also retained 
many of their conservative views on the prospects for reform and military 
designed for conflict with NATO.  Under pressure, a reluctant General Staff 
began a very slow process of downsizing the military by disbanding divisions.  
Like his predecessors, Grachev’s plan for reform continued to ignore many of the 
more pressing issues and concentrated on creation of the Mobile Forces, drawn 
from the remnants of his own former service, the Airborne Forces.  The Mobile 
Forces received preferential funding and support, while the remainder of the 
                                                 




military, which were to have been cut drastically to reduce costs, remained in 
place.  Deprived of the resources required to support the former Soviet military 
system, the bulk of the Russian military, comprised of an estimated 103 divisions, 
quickly began to decay.17 
 The influence of the American performance in the Persian Gulf War was 
apparent in Russian effort to establish the Mobile Forces.  The Russian military 
identified several key components of the Western doctrine that had allowed a 
smaller, but technologically advanced force, to overcoming a quantitatively larger 
opposing military: 
• Air operations lasted thirty-eight days, compared with only four on the 
ground, giving a ratio of 9 to 1. 
• Use of the latest electronic warfare equipment, including AWACS and 
JSTARS, added to the element of surprise. 
• Enemy communications were attacked simultaneously at all levels from 
tactical to strategic. 
• Electronic warfare and fire strikes reinforced one another through careful 
coordination regarding target, location, and time. 
• Intensity of air strikes had no precedent in any previous war.18 
 
These lessons learned had both positive and negative effects.  They encouraged 
the Russian military to pursue a force with similar capabilities, as the Gulf War 
appeared clearly to demonstrate how a smaller military force might be 
dramatically effective.  The Mobile Forces were to be modeled after the 
advanced Western militaries observed in the Persian Gulf, equipped with 
“surface to surface missiles, multi-barreled rocket launchers, attack helicopters, 
air assault and air mobile forces (a strong special forces element), and 
appropriately matched reconnaissance and C3 [command, control, and 
communications] capabilities.”19  
                                                 
17 Colin Robinson. “Russian Armed Forces Reform: Reaching Fitfully Toward a Professional 
Force.” (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 26 July 2002. 
http://www.cdi.org/mrp/russian-mr.cfm. 10 September 2002). 
 






However, it was also clear that a U.S.--led NATO force had the potential 
dramatically to out-perform the existing Russian military.  It raised the concern 
that Russia might not be capable of opposing any conventional military effort by 
the West and served to heighten the perception of a threat posed by the old 
adversaries, rather than decrease them. These two contending impressions had 
the combined effect of creating paralysis in the military reform effort.  Russia 
needed to create a modern, qualitatively improved military core in the form of the 
Mobile Forces.  However, the perceived threat posed by Western technological 
advantage made a dramatic downsizing of less advanced forces to reduce cost 
more difficult.  While these contradictory pressures were not the only factors in 
the slow pace of Russian military downsizing, they served the purposes of a 
military leadership famous for dragging their feet.     
While some forces had been disbanded or reorganized and a Directorate 
on Military Reform created, Grachev achieved little tangible success in reforming 
the Russian military prior to the first Chechen War in 1995.  The Russian military, 
including the fledgling Mobile Forces, performed poorly in that conflict. After the 
August 1995 defeat of the under-funded and undermanned Russian forces in 
Grozny by the Chechens, criticism of Grachev’s preferential support of his 
service began to increase.  The lightly equipped Mobile Forces were unable to 
perform as anticipated and the Russian military was ultimately forced to 
withdraw.20  An estimated 6,000 Russian soldiers were lost before the end of the 
first Chechen War in 1996.21  According to the Ministry of Defense, the conflict 
cost seven trillion rubles (approximately $1.4 billion), not including the cost of 
expended military hardware.  No additional funds were appropriated to offset this 
cost, further exacerbating the military’s economic situation.22  These dramatic 
                                                 
20 Pavel Felgenhauer. “Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure,” in Russian Defense Police 
Towards the Year 2000: Proceedings of the Conference at the Naval Postgraduate School, 26-27 
May 1997. Ed. Elizabeth Skinner and Mikhail Tsypkin. 
(http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/Felg.htm. 10 August 2002). 
 




22 Felgenhauer, “Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure.” 
losses, lack of military reform progress, and Grachev’s declining popularity led to 
his replacement by General Igor Rodionov in 1996. 
  Rodionov quickly revealed that he believed the military’s orientation 
toward a conventional war with the West remained appropriate.  His perception 
of the threats to Russian security centered on an allegedly growing threat posed 
by NATO and he insisted that budget levels should be increased to fund the 
army’s bloated battalions.23  Rodionov insisted that military reform, which had 
been reduced to the simple process of force downsizing, could not proceed 
without a budget increase.  A public dispute between Rodionov and Yuri Baturin, 
a civilian secretary on the Defense Council, over the costs of military reform, 
combined with Rodionov’s open objection to a revised military doctrine, civilian 
oversight of the military, or any movement away from a conscription-based 
military, lead to his dismissal in 1997.24  General Igor Sergeyev, of the Strategic 
Rocket Forces, succeeded him in May 1997 and began a new phase in the 
protracted effort to reform the Russian military. 
 Sergeyev was the first Minister of Defense who envisioned a Russian 
military that reflected the defense policy tasks outlined in the Principle Guidance 
on Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved in 1993.  These tasks 
included, “the simultaneous occurrence of stable nuclear deterrence and the 
sound preparation to handle local conflicts (to include simultaneous peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping operations).”25  Under the new Defense Minister, 
the Strategic Rocket Forces were to play a much more prominent role, reflecting 
the continued practice of the generals who held the post to favor their own 
branch of service.  A large military restructuring took place. The Space Forces 
were absorbed into the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Force and Air 
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Defense forces were combined under a single command.  The Ground Forces 
Headquarters was eliminated and four military districts merged into two.26  The 
slow process of reducing the number of individual formations continued, including 
some surprising reductions to the Mobile Forces.27   
 The reform strategy pursued under Sergeyev assumed that the deterrence 
value of the Strategic Rocket Forces would be sufficient to provide for security 
against external threats in the near-term, while the conventional forces were 
reformed.  A greater emphasis was placed on force maintenance, and limited 
improvements in Ground Forces readiness were demonstrated in the second 
Chechen war in 1999. However, limited training and a shortage of junior officers 
continued to hamper combat effectiveness.28  From 1997-1999, up to seventy 
percent of the defense budget was allocated to maintenance and personnel 
numbers were cut by thirty percent. 29  Research and Development and arms 
procurement were severely restricted.  These very limited procurement funds 
were channeled into the production of new strategic weapon systems and little 
funding remained for the conventional improvements that a reformed military 
really demanded.   
This over-emphasis on strategic weapons procurement lead to a dispute 
over service priorities between Sergeyev and Chief of the General Staff Anatoly 
Kvashnin, a career Ground Forces officer.  Again, internal squabbling 
demonstrated a lack of consensus within the military on the direction of reform or 
the types of forces needed to deal with the threats that faced the Russian 
Federation.  President Putin’s election and the replacement of Sergeyev by 
Sergei Ivanov, a former KGB associate of the new President, in March 2001 has 
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resulted in the reversal of Sergeyev’s move to eliminate the Ground Forces 
Headquarters and the re-establishment of independent Space Forces.  The first 
serious project to establish an all-volunteer unit, the 76th Airborne division, is now 
underway.  It will serve as a test case for the further transition away from a 
conscript-dependant military. 30 However, the General Staff remains opposed to 
concept of an all-professional force, just as it had prior to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
C. THE STATE OF MILITARY REFORM TODAY 
The status of Russian military reform today has hardly advanced since its 
inception in the late 1980’s. The long disjointed history of military reform reflects 
many of the internal difficulties that have plagued the process.  The most 
significant internal obstacle to the reform process has been the sustained 
opposition of the Russian military leadership, who refuse to part with the old-
Soviet model.  The lack of civilian oversight limits the ability of the government to 
force the pace of reform.  For example, the official Russian estimate of the 
number of troops in the armed forces in 1999 was 1,200,000. In 2002, Ivanov 
announced, “that after a successful reduction of 91,000 men, Russia's armed 
forces now number 1,275,000.”31 According to these numbers, the military 
actually grew in size after an apparent reduction. Either the ministry of defense 
was deliberately underestimating the size of the armed forces in 1999, or the 
2002 reductions that Ivanov cites are a fantasy.  No accounting by civilian 
leadership outside the military hierarchy makes determining the real status of the 
military reduction very difficult. 
The military leadership has also sought to obstruct the transition to a 
volunteer military.  The military originally intended to delay the experimental 
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conversion of a single division to an all-contract force to at least 2005.32  Only 
direct pressure from President Putin on the issue moved forward the timetable for 
its conversion.  In an effort to support its contention that this effort is simply too 
expensive, the military repeatedly increased its cost estimates for the conversion 
of the 76th division.  In December 2001, it was first announced that the 
conversion would cost 500 million rubles.  By March 2002, the figure grew to one 
billion rubles and on 20 May 2002, Ivanov announced that the full transition 
would cost 2.6 billion rubles.  No tangible evidence has emerged to support these 
dramatic increases in estimated cost and this appears to be little more than an 
effort by the military to portray the cost of transformation as prohibitively high.33   
The military continues to argue in favor of the conscription force on the 
basis of cost effectiveness and the need to maintain a mobilization base.  
Without it, they claim the Russian state would be deprived of a vital source of 
trained reservists in the event of war.  Such a position ignores the fact the 
Russian military lacks the capacity to equip these troops and further illustrates 
the General Staff’s belief that it must be prepared for a major confrontation 
requiring a large military force.  President Putin expressed the more widely held 
view of this issue at a Security Council meeting: “Or country’s economy is no 
longer a command economy, but our mobilization system is as old as the hills.  
This is why we have a lot of changes to make.”34 
The military also contends that the system of deferrals should be cut 
drastically, allowing the number of conscripts drafted each year to increase to 
600,000 men and the period of service reduced to six months.35  This seems 
ignore the fact that such a program would dramatically increase the burden on 
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the already limited training budget and create a massive problem of rapid 
personnel turn over.  Such a change in policy is highly unlikely, as the number of 
grounds for deferral continues to grow.  Increasing public opposition to 
conscription makes any reduction in the number of deferrals politically unrealistic. 
A Public Opinion Foundation survey of 1600 Russians conducted in February 
2002 found that only twenty-seven percent supported conscription, down from 
thirty-eight percent in 1998.  Nearly two thirds of those surveyed supported a 
move to a volunteer force.36  
 This growing opposition is fueled by a number of factors: conscripts are 
paid a meager salary for their service, far below what they could expect in other 
occupations, and their standard of living has steadily declined since the early 
1990’s.  President Putin described the situation at a Russian Security Council 
meeting in May 2001: 
With all honesty we have to acknowledge that today the 
servicemen are less well off than the rest of the population. 40% of 
the servicemen’s families have incomes that are smaller than the 
minimum living standard.  Although according to the law, the 
military service is considered a special state service, I don’t even 
want to start on the housing problem.  The armed forces and the 
agencies, which are considered by law on an equal footing with 
them, are very, very poorly taken care of as far as the housing is 
concerned.  Equally difficult is the situation with medical care.  The 
hospitals and other medical institutions are in a deplorable state.  
There also exists the problem of adaptation to civil life the retiring 
officers and other servicemen.37 
 
Poor discipline has lead to widespread hazing of troops by junior officers and 
more senior conscript soldiers.  This cycle of brutality is self-perpetuating.  As 
Yevgeny Gontmakher put it, the conscripts see this behavior as “one year they 
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beat us, the next year we in turn beat the new draftees.”38 In the one of the very 
few official statements on the matter of conscript hazing, at least twelve soldiers 
died in Chechnya as the result of hazing in July 2002 alone. Alexander Golts 
suggests that these casualty figures are typical for any given month in the 
Russian military and only reflect the incidents the military leadership is unable to 
conceal.  The admission by Ivanov that the military is only managing to call up 
twelve percent of the men eligible for service indicates that draft dodging has 
become a critical problem.  The military has been forced to resort to police 
sweeps through population centers to find recruits and force them to fulfill their 
service obligations.39 
One of chief concerns surrounding the entire military reform debate is 
cost.  For most of the 1990’s, the argument against the transition to smaller 
professional force better suited to Russia’s defense needs was that money was 
not available.  The military justifiably argued that better pay was needed to attract 
volunteers, but that the forced retirement of large numbers of career officers in 
the effort to downsize the force would require huge sums to provide legally 
guaranteed retirement benefits.   For example, the average wait for housing for 
military veterans in 1999 ranged from seven to nine years and only six percent of 
164,000 eligible retired personnel had received apartments.40 Russia did not 
report an official increase in nominal defense spending until 1999, when an 
additional 4.5 percent of the total federal outlay was allocated to defense, 
bringing the defense budget to 109 billion rubles.41  
Since 1999, defense spending in the Russian budget has increased 
dramatically with each successive year.  It rose to 218 billion rubles in the 
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FY2001 and to 270 billion rubles in 2002.42  Defense spending will continue to 
rise in 2003.  In August 2002, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin announced that 
the 2003 budget would include over 346 billion rubles (10.9 billion dollars) for 
defense.  This will account for nearly fifteen percent of the total budget and, 
according to Kudrin defense spending will increase more than any other budget 
category in 2003.43  As dramatic as these increases appear, they may not 
accurately represent the total Russian defense spending effort. Large sums are 
actually spent with no parliamentary oversight, exceeding the amounts 
authorized in the budget.  The actual economic burden on the Russian economy 
imposed by the military may be substantially higher, but lack of transparency in 
actual defense spending make these amounts difficult to calculate.   
Despite this rapid increase in spending, the actual amounts available to 
the armed forces to institute reform and modernize are woefully inadequate.   As 
much as fifteen to twenty-two percent of the defense budget is absorbed by the 
cost of inflation.  In addition, budget items, which were previously listed outside 
defense expenditures in the past, have been included in the newer budgets.  
These include peacekeeping activities, railroad troops, government support for 
defense related industries, and benefits for servicemen.  This contributes to the 
illusion of significant increases spent on the maintenance and improvement of 
the armed forces.44  Personnel and maintenance costs demand an increased 
portion of the military budget with each successive year, leaving considerably 
smaller amounts for procurement and Research and Development than the 
dramatic increases in the overall budget might reflect.   The inability to downsize 
the Russian military prevents significant increases in badly needed conventional 
arms procurement and the development of modernized military hardware.    
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 Recent developments suggest that President Putin is making a renewed 
effort to motivate the nearly stagnant military reform effort that has plagued 
Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  His strong political position may 
allow him to overcome the more conservative military leadership and its 
continued resistance to reform. The larger process of democratization in Russia 
may depend on its success.  If the process to reform the Russian military does 
not proceed, the economic, political, and social ramifications for the future of the 
Russian state could be dramatic.  These effects could extend beyond Russia’s 
borders to affect the many regions the share borders with Russia’s vast territory.  
The next chapter will examine the real and perceived threats that have influenced 
Russia’s strategic conceptions and military doctrine and the influence this exerts 
on the process of military reform. 
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III. IMPACT OF NATO – RUSSIA RELATIONS 
 
The military reform process in Russia is tied to Moscow’s perception of its 
present and future security needs.  The high costs associated with a completely 
reformed Russian military, based on a well trained and well-equipped 
professional force, requires a realistic assessment of the threats to Russian 
security.  Russia cannot afford to maintain its existing, ponderous military 
structure, designed to fight large-scale conventional and nuclear war, while also 
enduring the economic strain of military transformation.  Russia’s Military 
Doctrine and National Security Concept emphasize the central role of its 
shrinking nuclear arsenal, while the current challenges confronting Russia 
increasingly demonstrate the weaknesses in such an approach.  The Russian 
military’s preoccupation with its old Cold War adversaries and a desire to 
maintain Russia’s status as a great power dominate Moscow’s resistance to the 
adoption of a realistic force structure designed to deal with its present and 
foreseeable security challenges. 
A. EVOLUTION OF NATO RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Russia 
and the NATO alliance has had a significant impact on Moscow’s security 
outlook.   The Alliance has undergone a dramatic effort to transform itself to meet 
post-Cold War realities, while attempting to forge a more cooperative relationship 
with Russia.  However, Russia’s apprehension about NATO’s expansion effort 
and the implications of the NATO intervention in Kosovo has made the 
maintenance of a cooperative relationship difficult.  Skepticism about NATO’s 
intentions remained strong within Russia’s military leadership throughout the 
1990’s and fueled a conservative effort to resist substantial military restructuring. 
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 The collapse of the Soviet Union presented NATO with a serious dilemma 
in the early 1990s.  Since its creation in 1949, NATO’s existence had revolved 
around the defense of Europe against potential Soviet aggression.  In the wake 
of the Soviet collapse, the threat from the East quickly evaporated and the 
continued existence of the Alliance was called into question.  NATO was left with 
essentially three choices: attempt to ignore the change in the European security 
environment and maintain its collective defense focus, disband the alliance in 
favor of a new collective security structure in Europe, or redefine and refocus the 
Alliances role to address a broader range of collective security issues emerging 
in contemporary Europe. 
The first alternative -- that of maintaining NATO’s old focus on collective 
defense against future Russian aggression -- was clearly the most unrealistic 
approach.  While some fear of resurgent Russian ambitions in Europe remained, 
particularly in the east, the realization of Russia’s weakness made this an 
unlikely contingency in the foreseeable future.  Furthermore, the continued 
primacy of NATO’s collective defense mission threaten to create new dividing 
lines in Europe, preserving the “us and them” mentality of the Cold War, when a 
less adversarial relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation was 
clearly possible.45      
While clinging to a Cold War focus against a threat from Moscow was no 
longer workable, the demise of the Alliance was equally unacceptable.  Russia 
clearly favored this contingency, which would have dissolved or subordinated 
NATO and the collapsing Warsaw Pact into a new European collective security 
organization. In particular, there was a feeling among some members of that 
NATO should give way to a new collective security architecture based on the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), that would include 
Russia, Europe, and the United States in decisions on the future security of the 
continent.  The danger of this approach became clear in 1991, when Moscow 
refused to recognize CSCE efforts to resolve the status of the three Baltic 
Republics and blocked efforts to grant the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center any 
effective power.  The Soviets also attempted to enact treaties with former 
Warsaw Pact states that would have prevented their joining an alliance without 
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the approval of Moscow.46  These Russian efforts clearly illustrated the danger of 
turning European security over to the CSCE, or any organization that required 
the approval of all of its members to take action.   
It was quickly recognized that a re-orientation of NATO was necessary to 
keep the Alliance viable.  NATO’s value beyond its old Cold War focus on 
collective defense became clearer as the allies contemplated a Europe without 
the Alliance.  The alternative alignments, the CSCE and the EU, lacked NATO’s 
strength and reliability as an organizational mechanism and relied too heavily on 
the consensus of all members to take action.  America’s continued engagement 
in Europe could only be guaranteed by the trans-Atlantic partnership established 
and strengthened by American participation in NATO.  It was clear that 
maintaining this partnership was highly desirable from both an American and 
European perspective.   
 NATO’s internal functions increased dramatically in value in light of the 
changing geopolitical structure in Europe.  The former Soviet puppet states of the 
Warsaw Pact were undergoing dramatic, and potentially destabilizing, political 
change. NATO’s record as a stabilizing and integrating force in post-World War II 
Europe suggested that it could have a similar effect on the emerging 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.  NATO also had managed the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, denationalized defense planning, provided a 
forum to coordinate security policies, and encouraged democratic reforms, all of 
which promised to have a beneficial effect on these new neighbors. 
 The effort better to define NATO’s role in a post-Cold War Europe evolved 
during the early 1990’s.  Most significantly, NATO published its new Strategic 
Concept at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome in November 1991.  It 
highlighted the continued importance of NATO in shaping the future security 
environment in Europe. Specifically, four fundamental security tasks to be 
performed by the Alliance were defined:   
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 (i) To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable 
security environment in Europe, based on the growth of 
democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to 
intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose 
hegemony through the threat or use of force.  
 (ii) To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any 
issues that affect their vital interests, including possible 
developments posing risks for members' security, and for 
appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common 
concern.  
 (iii) To deter and defend against any threat of aggression 
against the territory of any NATO member state.  
 (iv) To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.47 
 
These four tasks highlighted the significant new commitment to roles beyond 
collective defense, with an emphasis on the promotion of democracy and 
peaceful resolution of disputes through consultation.  NATO asserted, “Our new 
strategic concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the 
radically changed situation in Europe, to realize in full our broad approach to 
stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental 
aspects, along with the indispensable defense dimension.”48  The collective 
defense function was retained, but applied in a broader sense to potential future 
threats, with no direct reference to a specific potential adversary.  
NATO’s new focus, with its collective security emphasis, quickly became 
linked to enlargement of the Alliance.  Significantly, the September 1995 Study 
on NATO enlargement outlined seven specific rationales as justification for 
enlargement and provided a foundation for NATO’s role in the future of Europe:  
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 Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including 
civilian and democratic control; 
 Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and 
habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building 
which characterize relations among the current Allies; 
 Promoting good-neighborly relations, which could benefit all the 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-
members of NATO; 
 Emphasizing common defense and extending its benefits and 
increasing transparency in defense planning and military 
budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might 
be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defense 
policies; 
 Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in 
Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing 
the countervailing tendency toward disintegration along ethnic 
and territorial lines; 
 Strengthening the Alliance’s ability to contribute to Europe and 
international security including through peacekeeping activities 
under the responsibility of OSCE and peacekeeping operations 
under the authority of the UN Security counsel as well as other 
new missions;  
 Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic Partnership.49   
 
These points significantly downplayed the collective defense role to an even 
greater degree than the Strategic Concept published just four years earlier.  They 
indicated an increased focus on the promotion of stability, reform, and collective 
security.50  While all of these points were valid arguments supporting the 
enlargement of NATO, they represented a significant departure from the primacy 
of collective defense.  While these statements continued to support the 
transformation of NATO’s purpose, and the accompanying enlargement in the 
east, there was concern that the collective defense role had been set aside. 
Concerns that the decision making structure of the Alliance would be threatened 
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by a significant enlargement that would also trouble relations with Russia by 
encroaching too quickly on the old Soviet sphere of influence persisted among 
leaders in the West, particularly in the United States.51 
The criteria used to measure the acceptability of new Alliance members 
drifted away from the assessment of what the candidate states offer in terms of 
enhanced mutual defense value and towards an evaluation of how the integration 
of new members would contribute to the political and economic stabilization of 
the continent.  If NATO’s collective defense role was to be preserved, other 
European institutions might have been more appropriate as an inclusive 
instrument.  The EU, with its direct economic and political emphasis, offered an 
attractive alternative to promoting stability through a NATO expansion process. 
The EU could serve as the pre-eminent structure for welcoming and encouraging 
new member countries into a larger European community.  
 While the European Union made some early suggestions that it was 
considering the eventual expansion its membership to former Warsaw Pact 
states, this process was, and continues to be, a slow one.  Attempts to rely on 
the EU as a mechanism for inclusion have been hampered by two 
considerations: First, American influence in the EU was distinctly absent. While 
America welcomes the EU in theory, the United States and the EU regard each 
other as commercial and political rivals.  America’s dominant position in NATO 
and the differences between the Alliance and the Union have made cooperation 
on the issue of enlargement problematic. Second, several EU members have 
resisted expanding the EU for fear of competition from the cheaper labor 
economies of Eastern Europe and the detrimental effect enlargement could have 
on EU decision making.52 As a consequence, offering membership in NATO has 
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been seen, on both sides of the Atlantic, as a simpler, cheaper, and faster 
alternative.  
Despite this effort to promote collective security, there was and remains a 
strong desire to retain NATO’s core mission of collective defense, a cornerstone 
of the Washington Treaty. 53   The interest in NATO membership within Central 
and Eastern European countries is not limited to the internal benefits of promoted 
stability and reform, but also the guarantees provided under Article V of the 
Washington Treaty. 54 Memories of betrayal by the West at Munich and Yalta 
linger in the psyche of the former Warsaw Pact States. Fear of abandonment by 
the West drives the desire for a concrete security guarantee. Consequently, the 
applicants viewed NATO membership, with the accompanying promise of 
collective defense, as the only reliable arrangement that could provide it.  
The tensions between the effort to redefine NATO's purpose and the 
continued importance placed on collective defense create considerable 
skepticism in Russia.  From the Russian perspective the expansion of NATO 
could be viewed simply as western opportunism. Is NATO’s concentration on 
collective security simply “window dressing” intended to conceal NATO’s 
adherence to its old anti-Soviet focus? Is it an effort to make the Alliance’s 
continued existence more palatable to its former adversaries? Or does NATO’s 
reorientation constitute a genuine effort to reform in a way that did not threaten 
Russian security?  Lingering Cold War mistrust between the Russian leadership 
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and the West continues to fuel this uncertainty.  Therefore, reassuring Russia 
became a central part of NATO’s strategy to successfully redefine its mission. 
 Efforts to reassure Russia began in 1990 with negotiations over the 
reunification of Germany.  Russia had been resistant to the idea of a reunified 
German for a number of reasons, both rational and irrational.  The United States 
led efforts to reassure Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev as negotiations on 
Germany slowly moved forward.  The status of NATO forces, particularly US 
forces that might move into the territory of East Germany, proved to be the 
critical stumbling block.  In February 1990, US Secretary of State James Baker 
asked: “Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO and with no 
U.S. Forces, perhaps with nuclear weapons? ... Or would you prefer a unified 
Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not 
shift one inch eastward from its present position?”55  Statements such as these 
were taken by the Russians to imply that continued expansion of NATO into the 
former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Republics had been ruled out.  While it appeared 
to offer a significant basis for early cooperation between Russian and NATO, it 
would become clear later that Baker’s statement constituted neither the definitive 
view of NATO or the United States.  As the disagreement over NATO’s first 
enlargement intensified, these negotiations would be pointed to by Moscow as a 
promise broken by the West. 
 As relations between the Russian Federation and NATO developed, 
Russia signed on to two NATO efforts to promote cooperation with non-NATO 
members to the East.  The first, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
established in the Rome Declaration in 1991 (later replaced by the Euro Atlantic 
Partnership Council in 1997), was a purely consultative effort to engage NATO’s 
neighbors to the east.  The second, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), was created 
in 1994 with the goal of creating a much deeper relationships through Individual 
Partnership Programs (IPP) developed in a “16+1” forum between NATO and the 
Partner. The stated purpose of PfP was defined as:  “At a pace and scope 
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determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we 
will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting 
democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, 
and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as 
peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as 
may be agreed.”56 
 Russia’s participation in both the NACC and PfP was limited.  While these 
efforts did increase consultation between Moscow and the Alliance, the Russian 
leadership remained skeptical.  Russia delayed its acceptance of the PfP IPP 
until 1995 and its participation in PfP cooperation with NATO was limited to civil-
emergency planning and has remained so.57  Involvement in the NACC and PfP 
did not grant Moscow what it fundamentally desired: not only a voice, but also a 
veto in its consultation with NATO.  Russia continued to push for NATO 
subordination to the OSCE58, where it could exercise greater control over 
Alliance activities. As the first round of NATO enlargement loomed, Russian 
opposition to NATO expansion increased.  It became clear that a common 
understanding between NATO and Russia would be required before any attempt 
at enlargement could proceed. 
This new basis for cooperation between NATO and Russia was 
established in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. 
The Founding Act established the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a forum for 
consultation and cooperation, enabling NATO and the Russian Federation to 
begin a more substantial program of security and defense-related cooperation. 
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The main role of the PJC was to strengthen cooperation between NATO and 
Russia and to identify opportunities for joint actions. Regular monthly meetings of 
the PJC quickly led to a much closer dialogue, but with the understanding that 
both sides retained the right to take decisions independently of the other.  The 
range of issues discussed included peacekeeping operations, the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, defense reforms, 
search and rescue at sea, civil emergency planning, scientific cooperation and 
environmental issues. 
Along with the creation of the PJC, came a Russian acceptance of the first 
round of NATO enlargement.  The Founding Act asserted the mutual “respect for 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent 
right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders 
and peoples' right of self-determination.”59  NATO achieved this agreement by 
making a number of concessions on future enlargement.  These included a 
promise not to station large deployments of conventional forces belonging to 
existing member states or to deploy any nuclear forces or infrastructure into the 
territory of new members.  NATO also agreed to a commitment that future 
expansion would not extend into the territory of the former Soviet Union.60  The 
Founding Act, in effect, removed a major stumbling block in the process of 
admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the alliance on 12 March 
1999. 
 NATO cooperation with Moscow appeared to be on the right track until 
NATO became involved in the Balkans in 1999. As Operation Allied Force began 
within two weeks of the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into 
NATO, many in the Russian leadership viewed the two events as linked and part 
of a common strategy. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov suggested as much in his 
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speech to the Duma on 27 March 1999. When criticising NATO's military action 
against Yugoslavia, Ivanov commented that, "having only just acquired three new 
members, NATO has immediately demonstrated its aggressive nature."61 
NATO's actions were perceived by some as part of an opportunistic US strategy 
to establish a global hegemony. Moscow was also angered that it was not 
adequately consulted on this issue in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.  
Russian President Yeltsin later stated: 
Only the UN Security Council has the right to take the decision on 
what measures, including measures of force, should be undertaken 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. The UN 
Security Council has not taken any decisions with regard to 
Yugoslavia. Not only has the UN Charter been violated but also the 
founding act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between 
Russia and NATO. In effect what we have here is an attempt by 
NATO to enter the 21st century in the uniform of world policeman. 
Russia will never agree to this.62 
 
Yeltsin’s statement illustrates the heart of Russia’s opposition to the NATO action 
in Kosovo. Russia strongly objected to the decision to intervene without 
authorization by the UN Security Council or the OSCE.  NATO’s position that UN 
or OSCE authorization, while desirable, was not essential for the Alliance to take 
military action, was the source of great concern in Moscow.  NATO’s move to act 
without a clear mandate from the UN threatened the importance of Russia’s 
status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.  Moscow feared that 
a dangerous precedent for future NATO actions that could ignore Russian 
interests had been set.  Further, Russia contended NATO intervention in Kosovo 
undermined UN authority.63 The Security Council seat represents one of the few 
remaining symbols of Russia’s self-image as a great power, and NATO’s action 
appeared to further undermine Moscow’s already weakened status.  In response, 
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Russia ceased all cooperation between its Ministry of Defence and NATO that 
existed under the terms of the Founding Act and discontinued its participation in 
the PJC.    
 Militarily, the failed attempt by a Russian battalion to seize the Pristina 
Airport on 12 June 1999 also contributed to Russia’s humiliation.  The move to 
preempt NATO intervention and hence stake Russia’s claim for a voice in the 
future of the Balkans was initially greeted with an “explosion of national pride and 
enthusiasm” in June 1999.  But Moscow’s inability to support the battalion 
demonstrated the Russian military’s inability to project power on even a small 
scale in the European theater.   Viktor Chernomyrdin’s attempt to negotiate an 
independent Russian sector ended in failure, and Russian forces in Kosovo were 
dispersed and subordinated to NATO command.64     
 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo spurred the first serious discussions within 
the General Staff, Security Council, Foreign Ministry, and Duma “concerning [the 
possibility] of a military conflict with NATO” since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.65  It created a reactionary movement to reassert Russia’s military power 
vis-à-vis the Alliance, and fueled suspicion about NATO’s true intentions in the 
post Cold-War security environment.  It ultimately led to the adoption of new 
Russian military and security policies that reemphasized Russia’s preoccupation 
with a perceived threat from NATO and shaped the continued resistance to 
military reform.   
B. RUSSIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT AND MILITARY DOCTRINE 
 Shortly after his entry into office in December 1999, President Putin 
signed two documents drafted by Russia’s foreign and defense ministries that 
codified Moscow’s security concerns and military objectives.  Both the 10 
January 2000 National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, and the 
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Russian Federation Military Doctrine, signed on 21 April, are primarily 
philosophical in nature.  Collectively, these documents outline Russia’s national 
interests, security challenges, view of its position in the international community, 
and the expected roles of the Russian military.  Discussion of operational issues 
is frequently vague as are the few references to a military reform process.  But 
Russia’s determination to maintain its illusory status as a great power is 
apparent.  Military power, particularly in the form of nuclear weapons, assumes a 
dominant role in Russia’s quest to assert a great power influence and has 
important implications for the military reform process. 
 The National Security Concept clearly states Moscow’s view of the 
international environment, and Russia’s desired place in it:  
The situation in the world is characterized by a dynamic 
transformation of the system of international relations. Following the 
end of the bipolar confrontation era, two mutually exclusive trends 
took shape. The first of these trends shows itself in the 
strengthened economic and political positions of a significant 
number of states and their integrative associations and in improved 
mechanisms for multilateral management of international 
processes. Economic, political, science and technological, 
environmental and information factors are playing an ever-
increasing role. Russia will facilitate the formation of an ideology of 
establishing a multi-polar world on this basis. The second trend 
shows itself in attempts to create an international relations structure 
based on domination by developed Western countries in the 
international community, under US leadership and designed for 
unilateral solutions (including the use of military force) to key issues 
in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of 
international law. The formation of international relations is 
accompanied by competition and also by the aspiration of a number 
of states to strengthen their influence on global politics, including by 
creating weapons of mass destruction. Military force and violence 
remain substantial aspects of international relations. Russia is one 
of the world's major countries, with centuries of history and rich 
cultural traditions. Despite the complex international situation and 
its own temporary difficulties, Russia continues to play an important 
role in global processes by virtue of its great economic, scientific, 
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technological and military potential and its unique strategic location 
on the Eurasian continent.66 
 
The National Security Concept then goes on to state:  
Russia's national interests in the international sphere lie in 
upholding its sovereignty and strengthening its position as a great 
power and as one of the influential centers of a multi-polar world, in 
development of equal and equitable relations with all countries and 
integrative associations and in particular with the members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia's traditional 
partners [.]67 
 
The Russian leadership makes several important statements in this document, 
including the assertion that Russia views the international relations environment 
as multi-polar in nature and that Russia holds great power status within that 
international order.  This contrasts directly with the American position that the 
current international order is dominated by the United States.68  The particular 
attention paid to “attempts to create an international relations structure based on 
domination by developed Western countries in the international community, 
under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions,” reflects a continued 
Russian preoccupation with the NATO alliance.69  Finally, the National Security 
Concept continues the Russia effort to maintain a degree of regional hegemony 
in the former-Soviet sphere of influence now loosely included in the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States or the area commonly referred to as the 
“near-abroad”. 
Despite a reluctant Russian recognition that NATO enlargement into the 
former Warsaw Pact is now unavoidable, attempts to bring former Soviet 
republics, particularly the Baltic States, into a European defense and economic 
sphere are viewed as an encroachment into Russia’s own sphere of influence.70  
NATO access to states sharing a border with Russia specifically violates 
Moscow’s declaration that the Baltic is “a zone of vital interests.”71  NATO forces 
with free access to the Russian frontier would require, under Moscow’s existing 
military doctrine, an increased allocation of limited conventional resources to the 
defense of that border.  Russia has created new military formations in the 
Moscow and North Caucasus Military Districts, including two air armies that have 
been re-established.  Russian naval exercises in the Mediterranean began to 
increase in the late 1990’s, as did efforts to strengthen the Black Sea and Baltic 
Fleets. The deployment of the final Ushakov class battlecruiser, Piotr Velikii to 
the Northern Fleet, rather than its planned assignment to the Pacific Fleet, 
reflects Moscow’s increased military reaction to NATO enlargement.72  
The U.S. approach to dealing with Moscow is directly linked to Russia’s 
relationship with NATO. Understandably, NATO is still seen by many in Russia 
as primarily a military structure dominated by the United States, which clings to 
Cold War ideology of containment and aims to keep Russia in an inferior 
position.  To some extent, this is a reflection of nostalgia for the defunct Warsaw 
Pact and of the old Soviet view of NATO as a client military structure that serves 
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American interests.  This view is given credibility by the fact that the dominant 
portion of forces and military expenditures committed to collective defense of 
NATO are provided by the United States, and by the fact that the American 
nuclear arsenal provides a great deal of NATO’s strategic security, makes the 
United States the driving force in NATO decision making.73  Given the unilateral 
nature of many U.S. security decisions regarding Russia, and their appearance in 
Moscow’s eyes as simple American opportunism, the Russian Federation can 
easily draw the conclusion that Washington will use any future consultation with 
NATO to take advantage of Russia’s current military and political weakness to 
advance an American agenda.   
 The rapid decay of its conventional armed forces has left nuclear weapons 
as the core instrument of Russian coercive political power.  The destructive 
power of a large nuclear weapons arsenal provides Russia with a symbol of its 
geo-strategic status that supports its great power ideology.  The belief that the 
importance of Russia’s Security Council seat had been diminished by NATO’s 
Kosovo campaign further magnified Moscow’s dependence on nuclear weapons 
as a symbol of prestige and strength.  Russia’s nuclear arms forced NATO and 
the United States to maintain special relationships with what is otherwise a 
greatly weakened actor in Europe.74  Russia’s nuclear weapons have also 
prevented any serious consideration of an American or NATO-led effort to 
intervene militarily in Chechnya, despite great concern over human rights abuses 
by Russian forces and the inability of the Russian government to bring the 
conflict to a peaceful conclusion. 
 In addition to their importance as a political instrument, nuclear weapons 
have assumed a more dominant role in Russia’s Military Doctrine.    Russia’s 
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inability to project conventional military power in the Kosovo conflict and the 
glaring weaknesses in Russia’s unreformed military led to an expanded role for 
its nuclear forces.  The Military Doctrine clearly specifies the doctrine of nuclear 
response to not only nuclear, but also non-nuclear threats to national security. 
The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons 
in response to nuclear and other types of weapons of mass 
destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to 
large-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations 
critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.75  
     
The Soviet Union’s policy of no first use of nuclear weapons has been 
discarded.76  “Nuclear weapons are no longer regarded simply as a deterrent, but 
as a means of warfighting.”77 
From the Russian perspective, the primacy of nuclear forces is a product 
of fiscal and military reality.  Russia possesses less than half as many 
conventional forces, quantitatively, as the NATO has available in Europe alone. 
The further expansion of NATO will increase this disparity. 78   This reliance on 
nuclear weapons to offset conventional inferiority offers an inadequate response 
to NATO expansion.  Even worse from Moscow’s perspective, the Russian use of 
strategy designed to counter a perceived US threat in Europe has been applied 
to Russia’s southern and eastern theatres as well, where it has proven 
remarkably ineffective in dealing with real security threats.   
C. WEAKNESSES OF RUSSIA’S MILITARY DOCTRINE 
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The greater deterrence value of nuclear arms and their low maintenance 
costs when compared to conventional forces make them an attractive option 
when considering the limited finances available to maintain the Russian military.    
Though he has now been replaced, former Defense Minister Sergeyev oversaw 
the development and eventual approval for the Military Doctrine that reflects his 
approach to military reform.  As discussed previously, Sergeyev advocated a 
reform strategy that relied heavily on a relatively well-funded nuclear weapons 
program to insure Russian security and to provide time for the more difficult and 
lengthy process of reforming the conventional forces.  Prior to the signing of the 
2000 Military Doctrine, the Duma adopted the law On Financing the Defense 
Contract for Strategic Nuclear Forces that devoted of about forty percent of the 
Russian defense budget to strategic forces.  In addition, the “law emphasize[d] 
the use of tactical nuclear forces as the prime candidate for first use against large 
conventional attack.”79  
The concept of using nuclear weapons in the short term to shield 
conventional force reform is not totally unrealistic.  However, it assumes that a 
large nuclear arsenal can deter threats to Russian security.  Critics of the nuclear 
first use strategy claim that it may not be a credible deterrent against NATO or 
the United States.  A large-scale military confrontation between Russia and 
NATO or the United States remains a very remote possibility.  Meanwhile, the 
potential for future operations similar in scale to the NATO intervention in the 
Balkans remains high.  Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the prestige that 
accompanies it did little to dissuade NATO from acting in Kosovo before Russia’s 
National Security Concept and Military Doctrine were published.  While these 
documents suggest that Russia would be willing to use nuclear weapons in the 
event of a conventional attack that threatens Russia’s survival, it is not clear that 
the doctrine of nuclear first use will actually deter future NATO or American 
action outside Russian territory.80  
                                                 





While Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons has proven successful in 
maintaining a degree of Russia’s geopolitical influence, it has a number of critical 
weaknesses in light of the emergence of a number of non-traditional threats on 
Russia’s southern periphery that cannot be adequately addressed by Russia’s 
nuclear arsenal.  These threats, in particular the ongoing insurgency in 
Chechnya, require conventional forces trained and equipped to deal with them. 
But thus far Russia has been unable to reform its conventional forces adequately 
to meet these challenges.  The National Security Concept does recognize these 
problems. 
Adverse trends in the military sphere are being assisted by delays 
in reforming the military and the defense industry of the Russian 
Federation, by inadequate funding for defense and by a poor 
regulatory and legal framework. At the present time, this can be 
seen in the critically low level of operational and military training in 
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and of the other forces 
and military bodies and authorities, and in the impermissible drop in 
equipment of the forces with modern armaments and military and 
special hardware, and in the extreme acuteness of social problems; 
this leads to a weakening of the military security of the Russian 
Federation as a whole. 
  
Threats to the national security and interests of the Russian 
Federation in the border sphere are caused by the following: 
  
• economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion by 
neighboring states into Russian territory;  
• increased activity by cross-border organized crime and also 
by foreign terrorist organizations.81 
 
However, despite this candid assessment, the lack of substantial military reform 
since the National Security Concept’s publication leaves the Russian Federation 
in a poor position to face many of its present and future security challenges. 
Defense Minister Sergeyev’s replacement in March 2001 reflects some 
recognition of the flaws in a doctrine that so heavily emphasizes nuclear forces.82 
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 As discussed previously, the continuing conflict in Chechnya has 
demonstrated the Russian military’s limited capacity to deal with these new 
threats.  The cost of the campaign has certainly strained Russia’s limited defense 
budget, creating an additional burden that limits the funds available for military 
reform.  While Chechnya has been occupied, the devastation of Grozny and 
other areas has destroyed the region economically and inflicted heavy casualties 
on the civilian population.  Guerilla attacks continue to plague the Russian 
occupation forces and the spread of terrorist groups threatens to destabilize the 
rest of the Caucasus. Moscow’s inability to bring the conflict to an end raises 
serious concerns that Russia will not be able to simultaneously handle similar 
regional conflicts, maintain a strong nuclear force, and carry out any real program 
of military reform.83  For example, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense 
Committee in the Russian Duma, Alexei Arbatov, has suggested that the Russian 
military could complete a successful transformation that addresses many of the 
armed forces capability limitations within ten years.  In his Marshall Center 
Paper, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from 
Kosovo and Chechnya, he offered several alternative models, with variations in 
the size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, conventional force size, and defense spend 
that could accomplish this goal. However, he asserts that any successful 
transformation of the military will only be possible if Russia brings the Chechen 
conflict to a conclusion and avoids similar regional conflicts until the reform 
process is complete.84     
Russia is unlikely to face a large-scale conventional or nuclear war in the 
near future.  However, the time remaining for Russia to conduct meaningful 
military reform to meet future security challenges may be running out.  Short and 
long-term security challenges are emerging in Central Asia and the Far East, in 
addition to the existing problems in the North Caucasus.  Russia can no longer 
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afford to delay the military reform process if it hopes to meet these challenges 
with a modern, rehabilitated military. 
 The ongoing Chechen conflict has lead to the deployment of more 
conventional forces in the North Caucasus Military District than any other Military 
District in Russia, exceeding the deployments limits for the region established by 
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.  This includes large numbers of 
Russia’s best-equipped and trained troops, as well as forces from the MVD and 
FSB.  Russia also has numerous peacekeeping commitments in other states in 
the region. 85  The North Caucasus region is likely to remain the most active 
theater for the Russian military for the foreseeable future. 
 Russia faces a number of non-traditional threats in Central Asia.  
Difficulties in maintaining border controls on Russia’s border with Kazakhstan 
have lead to severe problems with drug trafficking and arms smuggling.  Russian 
border guards in Tajikistan have been unable to eliminate most of the illegal 
traffic that enters the region from Afghanistan.  This problem is primarily due to a 
lack of resources and limited customs controls on the region’s numerous internal 
and external borders.86 
 The mixture of various ethnic groups in the region, divided by artificial 
state boundaries established under Soviet rule, increases the potential for ethnic 
or nationalist conflict.  The Russian populations remaining in the Central Asia 
republics, particularly northern Kazakhstan, could prove to be a source of ethnic 
tension.  Russia’s desire to maintain its influence in the region and to protect the 
interests of these ethnic Russians could led to interventions Moscow in future 
ethnic conflicts.87   
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Russia’s greatest long-term security concern is its future relationship with 
China.  Currently, relations between Russia and China are tension free.  Both 
countries share a number of short-term interests, led by opposition to “the idea of 
a world led by the United States and favor a multipolar international order.”  This 
was affirmed in the Declaration on a Multipolar International System, signed by 
both countries in April 1997.88  More importantly, China has become the leading 
market for Russian arms exports.  “Russia is selling technology that would take 
China a very long time and huge financial resources to develop by itself and 
which it absolutely could not get anywhere else.”89    Russia’s military sales to 
China include warships, “air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, tanks (T-72s), 
fighters (Su-27s), armored fighting vehicles, and modern electronic devices.”90  
The two countries’ shared economic and geopolitical interests will likely serve to 
maintain a cooperative relationship in the near-term. 
 However, long-term prospects for good relations between China and 
Russia are less promising.  At its current rate of economic growth, China is 
expected to develop further its own defense industrial complex.  The extraction of 
Russian military technology, in addition to hardware, will ultimately make China 
less dependant on Russian arms exports.  As the technology gap between 
Russia and China closes, “the economic benefits of Russian arms sales will 
increasingly be outweighed by the potential security risks of delivering 
sophisticated arms technologies to China.”  This is of particular concern to 
Russia’s military leadership, who view China’s ever-increased conventional 
military capability with growing skepticism.91 Russia already faces a numerical 
inferiority in conventional forces to China in the Far East.  A drastic increase in 
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the Chinese nuclear arsenal, combined with the continued decline in the size and 
age of the Russian strategic nuclear force, could result in a “numerical parity” in 
these weapons “between 2010 and 2015.”  This would eliminate Russia’s only 
remaining military advantage over its most powerful Asian neighbor.92 
 Beyond the issues of military balance, the demographic changes occurring 
in the Far East will become increasingly threatening to Russia.  The slow process 
of Russian migration out of the region and the growth of the ethnic Chinese 
population are weakening Moscow’s control over these distant provinces.  
“Roughly 5 million Russians are facing 130 million Chinese along the border 
rivers.”  The pressures of overpopulation in northern China, exasperated by 
limited resources in region the may increase the likelihood of territorial disputes 
along the border.93   
 Finally, China’s growing interest in Central Asia could lead to a 
deterioration of relations with Moscow.  Russia’s view of the former-Soviet 
republics in Asia as part of its own economic sphere of influence may be 
challenged by Chinese efforts to access the region’s oil and gas export markets.  
Chinese agreements with Kazakhstan in September 1997 to construct new oil 
pipelines to the Pacific coast threaten Russia’s current monopoly on energy 
export from the region.94  A dispute over influence in the region could lead to a 
deterioration of relations between Moscow and Beijing as China’s military power 
begins to rival that of Russia.    
 Moscow’s preoccupation with NATO has led to an over-emphasis on 
nuclear weapons as the central element of Russian military power.  The cost of 
maintaining a large nuclear arsenal, combined with the military leadership’s 
reluctance to implement a serious reform program and the economic strain of the 
conflict in Chechnya, has left Russia vulnerable to a number of threats in other 
regions.   Without a reorientation of Russia’s military away from a perceived 
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NATO threat, Moscow may find that its armed forces are unprepared for more 
serious security challenges in other regions.  The past failures to achieve a 
cooperative relationship between Russia and the Alliance have allowed old threat 
assessments to linger in the minds of the military leadership.  However, recent 
developments in the relationship between NATO and Russian Federation, 
combined with President Putin’s more realistic approach to Russia’s political and 
military status, could break these old tendencies and open the way for 
meaningful military reform.     
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IV. NEW INFLUENCES ON RUSSIAN MILTARY REFORM 
 
As the record of NATO relations with the Russian Federation 
demonstrates, the interaction with Moscow over the future of the Alliance has 
been a turbulent one, with cooperation repeatedly warming and cooling 
throughout the 1990’s.  NATO’s actions in Kosovo and the Alliance’s continued 
enlargement have provided the Russian military with a potential threat it has 
used to justify resistance to reform within its ranks.  NATO expansion also 
offered political hardliners a target for anti-Western rhetoric.  Russia’s National 
Security Concept and Military Doctrine reflect a basic adversarial vision of NATO, 
as does Russia’s military structure.  This preoccupation, combined with limited 
financial resources and the reluctance of the military elite to pursue aggressively 
a program of military reform, prevented Russia from adopting a military structure 
more appropriate to its current and projected defense needs.  However, 
President Vladimir Putin’s decision to offer a dramatically increased level of 
cooperation with NATO and the United States since the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and his more 
realistic approach to Russia’s defense needs, has the potential to reverse the 
existing trends.  Closer cooperation between Russia, NATO, and the United 
States presents the Russian President with an opportunity to overcome the 
military’s conservative attitudes and to begin a more genuine effort to reform 
Russia’s military.  
A. PERSONAL INFLUENCE OF RUSSIAN PRESIDENT PUTIN 
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Vladimir Putin moved quickly to strengthen his position as the new 
Russian President in 2000.  Some social improvements made him very popular 
with the Russian public.  He took advantage of higher oil prices and Russia’s 
tremendous petroleum export capability to speed the recovery from the Russian 
financial crisis in the late 1990’s. Increased revenues led to “the timely payment 
of state salaries and pensions.”  This was of particular importance to the Russian 
public.  
[A]ccording to a March 2001 survey, when respondents were asked 
what they considered to be Putin's major achievements in his first 
year as president, timely payment of salaries and pension ranked 
first (39 percent); incorporation of the old Soviet anthem's melody in 
the new Russian anthem was second (11 percent); foreign policy, 
third (10 percent); reestablishment of order in Chechnya, fourth (8 
percent); and the fight against corruption, fifth (6 percent).95 
 
The second and third most popular responses to this survey reflected the other 
mechanism that Putin used to strengthen his power base. In his first months in 
office, he relied on anti-American and anti-NATO rhetoric that appealed to the 
great power nostalgia of Russian military and political elites, reinforcing his image 
as a great leader.”96  In his July 2000 address to the federal assembly, Putin 
“promised to restore the country to its position as a great state and to avert the 
danger ‘of the systemic challenge to Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity 
on the part of those forces striving for the geopolitical restructuring of the 
world.’”97 
 The Kremlin used its ability to influence the Russian media to encourage 
the expression of anti-American sentiment.  Putin also worked to use the 
intelligentsia to fuel opposition to any degradation in Russia’s geopolitical 
standing. For example, he encouraged the publication of a survey of over two 
hundred foreign policy experts by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and 
Ethnic Studies.  It reported that most of these experts “were strongly against the 
idea of Russia's establishment of cordial relations with the United States.”98 
According to “one of Putin's political advisers, ‘Russia must be ready to enter 
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harsh confrontations with America on all issues related to Russia's role in the 
world.’"99   
Putin displayed a determination to maintain Russia’s position as an 
influential leader on the European and global stage despite its weakened status. 
In Moscow’s view, Russia remained a major power because of its sheer size, its 
enormous reserves of natural resources, and it still significant, if degraded, 
military might.  Russia entertained the possibility of an anti-American alliance 
with India and China and suggested the possibility of “supporting rogue states, 
such as Iran, ‘as an anti-American trump card.’”100 In Europe, Putin opposed 
continued NATO enlargement, particularly the inclusion of the Baltic States.  On 
3 September 2001, he expressed these concerns.  “Pushing NATO’s limits to 
Russia does not create a universal security in Europe, it does not solve any key 
issue in Europe.”101  The Russian President was clearly adopting a position that 
echoed the adversarial perspective of Russia’s military leadership.  
However, only one week after Putin’s comments opposing NATO 
expansion, the landscape of Russian foreign policy toward the United States and 
NATO changed dramatically.  Moscow’s reaction to the atrocities committed at 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Al Qaeda terrorists represented a 
dramatic reversal in Putin’s anti-American rhetoric.  Within hours, Putin 
telephoned President Bush to offer Russia’s assistance and support.  This 
included the cancellation of a major military exercise in the Pacific that would 
have taxed airborne surveillance assets needed to secure American airspace in 
the days following the attack.102 This personal exchange between the two heads 
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of state marked the beginning of a much more cooperative approach in Russia’s 
relationship with the United States and NATO. 
Putin had several motivations for the dramatic shift in Russian foreign 
policy.  The American campaign to combat terrorism in Central Asia benefits 
Russia’s own security interests.  Russia concerns about the rise of Islamic 
militancy in the region and its own military’s inability to deal effectively with this 
threat made an American campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan very 
attractive.103  In addition, Russia’s support for the American-led effort helps to 
justify the ongoing war in Chechnya and reduce foreign criticism over the conduct 
of the Russian military in the region.104   
The antagonistic political approach to NATO and the United States that 
ignores Russia’s economic dependence on trading relationships with Europe was 
a critical mismatch in Russian foreign policy.  Despite some recent signs of 
economic growth based increased on oil exports, Putin recognizes that Russia’s 
financial vitality depends on a strong economic relationship with Europe.  
“Ranked by the size of its gross national product, Russia place[s] thirteenth in the 
world, behind even South Korea and the Netherlands.”105 Closer cooperation 
could strengthen relations with the European Union, which is becoming Russia’s 
most important trading partner, and could help accelerate its entry into the World 
Trade Organization.106  Putin has also admitted publicly that Russia must focus 
on developing its economy instead of engaging in heavy-handed power politics 
on in international relations: "Decisions are taken on the basis of what we need in 
reality, not on the moon."107   
                                                 
103 Andrei Piontkovsky, “What Allies Does Today’s Russia Need?” The Russia Journal, (26 
October – 1 November 2001). 
 
104 Kempe. “Making the Most of the Russian Embrace.” 
 
105 Shlapentokh, p. 136. 
 
106 Geoff Winestock. “Putin Appears to Get Ear of US, EU on Two Fronts-West is Receptive to 




107 Karen Elliot House and Andrew Higgins. “Putin Says Bush Shouldn't Go It Alone”, Wall Street 
Journal, (2 February 2002). 
Finally, Putin recognized that Russia’s military reform effort was hampered 
by a military doctrine and foreign policy that overemphasized a threat from NATO 
and the United States.  The military leadership exploited the anti-American and 
anti-NATO sentiment that Putin helped to create, using it as a justification to 
resist serious force restructuring and reform initiatives.  Downplaying this 
perceived threat would weaken the position of Russia’s generals and remove one 
of the existing obstacles in the process to reform the military.  
Two specific factors reflecting the acute problem of military reform drew 
greater attention from Putin.  The first was the loss of the Russian nuclear 
submarine Kursk on 12 August 2000.  The immediate impression left by the loss 
of the Oscar-class submarine was one of growing obsolescence in the Russian 
Navy and the lack of resources to mount an effective rescue effort to save the 
lives of the ship’s 118-man crew.108  However, the aftermath of the operation 
became muddled in false accusations and denials by the navy’s commander in 
chief, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, who attempted to obscure the facts of the 
disaster.  He vigorously advanced the false accusation that the disaster was the 
result of an incident with a NATO submarine and that the crew had not 
survived.109  Kuroyedov’s not only misinformed the Russian public, but the 
Russian navy’s objections to Western assistance in a rescue effort may have 
been fueled by his accusations of NATO involvement in the incident.  The 
disaster not only demonstrated the growing decline in military capability, but also 
the military leadership’s willingness to obscure the facts in an effort to protect its 
own interests and the limits on civilian oversight of the armed forces.   
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Putin’s second major military concern was the ongoing conflict in 
Chechnya.  Public support for the war has declined dramatically. 
In late 1999, roughly two-thirds of the Russian population favored 
active military operations in Chechnya … but in April 2001, only 
one-third supported the war effort, with 58 percent supporting 
peace negotiations.110 
 
Chechnya has become a huge drain on Russian military resources, demanding 
the deployment of most of Russia’s elite Airborne troops in addition to forces 
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB.111 The military’s heavy-handed 
tactics in Chechnya continues to drive new recruits into the separatist camp and 
intensifies the decline in Russia’s conventional warfighting capability that is 
becoming increasingly evident.      
President Putin demonstrated his willingness to correct the serious 
problems of insufficient and misappropriated funding for the armed forces.  He 
signed the classified State Armaments Program for 2001-2010 on 20 January 
2002.  The only official information on this document was released in an interview 
of Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments Colonel General Alexei Moskovsky 
published in the Russian newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda on 19 February 2002.  
According to Moskovsky, one of the documents included in the program is the 
“Plan for the build-up and development of the Armed Forces till 2005.”  The main 
emphasis on this program is R&D and serial production of new equipment, which 
was seriously neglected in the late 1990’s.  R&D is to now receive approximately 
forty percent of the defense budget, only slightly less than the amounts dedicated 
to new production.112  After 2005, the percentage of the defense budget 
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dedicated to procurement will rise from sixty-five to seventy percent.  Force 
maintenance costs will receive a consistent eleven to twelve percent until 
2010.113  It is unclear how closely this plan will be followed, but it could reflect a 
more balanced attempt to fund the transformation of the Russian armed forces. 
More importantly, Putin has begun to recognize the need to overcome the 
opposition to reform that is so heavily entrenched within the military leadership.  
One way to eliminate this opposition is to simply remove the generals.  Over a 
year after the Kursk accident, Putin suddenly demoted a number of admirals with 
connections to the incident. In November 2001, 
Putin punished the admirals at precisely the moment when mutual 
tension between the generals and the Kremlin became evident.  
Just at this moment, rumors began to circulate in Moscow that 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, a close Putin ally, doesn’t have 
authority with the generals.  Putin chose this moment to give the 
military a public dressing down.  Unlike former Defense minister 
Gen. Igor Rodinov, who was fired by then President Boris Yeltsin, 
these military bosses, whose responsibility is obvious, can’t claim 
that they have fallen victim to intrigues.  Putin, it seems, kept them 
in reserve with a black mark against their names, waiting for the 
right moment to show the Army just how tough he can be.  Now the 
moment has come.  Rumors that are circulating in [the Ministry of 
Defense] now say that Putin is preparing to abolish one thousand 
generals’ positions (more than half).114    
 
The threat of losing their coveted postings, along with many desirable benefits, 
could have a dramatic effect on the military leadership’s resistance to reform.     
The generals are under increasing pressure to drop their opposition and begin a 
more serious effort to correct the military’s problems.  
B. IMPACT OF RECENT SECURITY AGREEMENTS 
 Despite his efforts to reign in the generals, perhaps the most effective way 
to overcome their opposition to reform is to diminish the foundation of the claims 
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that NATO and the United States remain a serious threat to Russian security.  
Since his sudden move to support the American campaign on terrorism in the 
wake of the 11 September attacks, Putin has reached a number of agreements 
that deepen Russia’s cooperation with its former adversaries.   The creation of 
the NATO-Russia Council, military cooperation with the United States in 
Afghanistan, and the signing of the treaty of Moscow all contribute to the effort by 
the Russian President to reduce the antagonistic relationships with the West. 
A more cooperative approach to future relations between NATO and 
Russia appeared in late 2001.  Originally dubbed “NATO at Twenty”, this 
agreement emerged following a meeting between President Putin and NATO 
Secretary General Lord Robertson in Brussels in 3 October 2001 and aimed to 
establish new council to replace the Permanent Joint Council set up in 1997 as a 
consultative forum between the Alliance and Moscow.  On 28 May 2002, at 
NATO’s summit in Rome, the NATO-Russia Council was formally established 
after several months of negotiation. 115   The goal of this new council is to allow 
greater Russian involvement in NATO decision-making.  Chaired by the 
Secretary General, it grants Russia the ability to take joint decisions with the 
other members of the Alliance in areas such as anti-terrorism, crisis 
management, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, ballistic missile defense, 
search and rescue at sea, and civil emergency response. 116  Core discussions 
over collective defense issues would remain with the actual NATO membership, 
as would any decision on NATO enlargement, with no power to block these 
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actions granted to Moscow.  However, the alliance members would approach 
their discussions with the Russians with no pre-coordinated positions.117  
The NATO-Russia Council promises to reinvigorate a cooperative 
relationship between Brussels and Moscow that was disrupted by the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo.  It establishes a regular dialogue between Russia’s 
military and political leadership and their Alliance counterparts. 
[M]eetings of the NATO-Russia Council will be held at least monthly 
at the level of ambassadors and military representatives; twice 
yearly at the level of foreign and defence ministers and chiefs of 
staff; and occasionally at summit level.118 
 
These meetings should promote greater transparency in the areas of military 
planning and threat assessments, reassuring the Russian leadership that NATO 
poses no threat.  Increased participation in joint military exercises also has the 
potential to promote a more optimistic attitude among Russian officers about 
NATO’s post-Cold War purpose.  
 While increased military cooperation between NATO and Russia appears 
to be likely in the near future, Russia’s most significant cooperative military effort 
with the West has been its alignment with the United States since 11 September 
2002.   President Putin ignored the opposition expressed by the Russian military, 
including Defense Minister Ivanov, to any participation or assistance in the 
American campaign in Afghanistan.  Instead, he fully supported the use of bases 
in Central Asia by U.S. forces and authorized the use of Russian airspace in 
support of the war effort.  He also suggested the Russian military could 
participate in the campaign, despite objections from the political and military elite 
who were reluctant to commit to another military operation in Afghanistan.  
Veterans of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan believed the American effort was 
likely to fail and had little interest in providing assistance.119   
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 Russia’s military cooperation in Operation Enduring Freedom has been 
significant.  Officially reported Russian military contributions in Afghanistan have 
been limited to non-combat activities.  According to the US State Department, 
Russian contributions have included: 
• Russia started providing humanitarian assistance to the population 
of Afghanistan in October 2001. Russia has supported HA 
operations by transporting more than 420,296 tons of food 
commodities, 2,198 tons of medicines, 15,282 beds, 1,200 heaters, 
13 mini electric power stations, 780 tents, 11,000 blankets, 49,674 
bedding kits, 11,000 pieces of kitchen utensils, and nine tons of 
detergents.  
• In December 2001, Russian personnel started reconstruction of the 
Salang tunnel, a major transport structure connecting northern and 
southern provinces of Afghanistan. In January 2002, the Salang 
tunnel was officially opened for regular traffic.  
• In January 2002, as a result of a joint Russian-German project, 
pontoon passage across Pianj River was put into service. Together 
with the Salang tunnel it allowed the organization of a continuous 
route from Tajikistan to central region of Afghanistan for delivery of 
international humanitarian assistance.  
• Russia provided the first coalition hospital in Kabul on November 
29, 2001. The hospital treated more than 6,000 patients before 
Russia turned the facility over to the local population on January 
25, 2002.  
• On March 29, 2002, EMERCOM (Russia's Emergency Response 
Organization) deployed its mobile hospital to Nakhreen and began 
medical assistance to the victims of the earthquake in Afghanistan. 
Thus far, EMERCOM has delivered over 100 metric tons of HA 
supplies to the Nakhreen area to include: provisions; medicines; 
and means for cleaning water. Additionally, Russian rescue teams 
have conducted search and rescue operations throughout the area.  
• On April 24, 2002, Russia presented the Afghan government 42 
special vehicles including 37 tracked, two fuel, two maintenance 
vehicles and two 4-wheel drive vehicles.120 
In addition, Russia supplied the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance with heavy 
weapons prior to 11 September 2001 and continues to do so.  Putin reportedly 
used the influence he gained through these sales “to persuade the Russian-
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backed factions within the Afghan Northern Alliance to support Hamid Karzai as 
their new president.”121 Russia has also made significant contributions in 
intelligence gathering, though the specific nature of the information shared has 
not been disclosed.  According to Defense Minister Ivanov, “[t]o a large extent, it 
concerns Russia’s use of special services and here I cannot comment any 
further.”122 Rumors of direct military involvement includes suggests that the 
United States has hired Russian mercenaries to fight in the war, though this is 
strongly denied by Defense Minister Ivanov.123  
 Moscow’s assistance in gaining access to bases in Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan has been critical to the American war effort.  It provided US forces with 
forward base to mount operations in Afghanistan, reducing the dependence on 
military assets delivered through Pakistan from the Indian Ocean.  Recently, the 
American media has revealed that Russia not only permitted the use of its 
airspace by American aircraft, but also allowed the use of its rail links to Central 
Asia to transport “huge shipments of American war materiel … through Russian 
territory by rail, from northern European ports in Murmansk and Helsinki, and 
from the Russian Far Eastern port of Vladivostok.”124 While the Russian’s have 
refused to confirm these reports, the transport of US war material through 
Russian territory represents the most significant direct military cooperation with 
the American armed forces since World War II.125   Professor Dick Melanson of 
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the National War College suggests “that [this assistance] takes the relationship 
[between Washington and Moscow] to another level.”126   
 The success of the American campaign in Afghanistan presents a number 
of important implications for the Russian military reform process.  Doubts by 
Russian generals that America’s volunteer military force could successfully 
conduct a military operation in Afghanistan’s mountains proved to be groundless.  
It also dramatically illustrated the broadening gap between American and 
Russian conventional military capability, which has grown significantly since the 
Persian Gulf War.   Most importantly, the high level of cooperation reached 
during the conflict weakens claims by Russia’s elite that the greatest threat to 
Russian security emanates from the West.  In fact, closer cooperation between 
Moscow and Washington resulted in the ouster of the Taliban, a regime 
considered to be among the principle dangers to Russian security in Central 
Asia, and a threat the Russian military was ill prepared to face.127   
 Finally, President Putin’s effort to align Russia with the West has led to a 
significant agreement with the United States on the reduction of strategic nuclear 
arms.  Signed at the summit between the President Putin and President Bush in 
Moscow on 24 May 2002, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty calls for the 
reduction of both countries’ strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads 
by 31 December 2012.128  This treaty differs in several important areas from the 
START II treaty, which the Russian Duma terminated after the official American 
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.  SORT does not call for 
reductions in the number of strategic delivery systems, only the warheads, nor 
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does it place any limits on the use of multiple-warhead land-based missiles 
beyond those established in the START I treaty.129  The absence of limits on 
multiple-warhead weapons was a concession to American interests in deploying 
a National Missile Defense (NMD) system.130  But more importantly, the treaty 
satisfied Russian demands for a legally binding agreement to replace START II, 
establishing new limits in the number of deployed warheads available to both 
countries.131 
 While SORT is yet to ratified by the US Senate or the Russian Duma, and 
the detailed procedures for dismantlement are yet to be established, they treaty 
has the potential to have a dramatic effect on Russian defense spending and, in 
turn, Russian military reform.  By establishing a new, lower ceiling for strategic 
warhead totals and allowing the continued use of multiple warheads on a single 
weapon, SORT greatly reduces the number of strategic delivery systems needed 
by Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces to maintain an arsenal comparable to the 
United States.  In doing so, the treaty insures that Russia will retain a sufficient 
strategic nuclear arsenal, relative to the United States, to provide a symbol of its 
a great power status.  This reduces the pressure to retain Russia’s fleet of 
ballistic missiles at current levels, along with forces and services need to 
maintain them. Assuming defense spending, at a minimum, remains constant, 
this should allow increased spending on the financially strained conventional 
forces. 
 Collectively, Putin’s efforts to create a closer strategic partnership with 
both the United States and NATO have weakened claims by Russia’s military 
leadership that the West represents a threat to Russian security.  In doing so, he 
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has removed much of the justification used by the generals to maintain Russia’s 
bloated military structure and resist a genuine reform effort.  However, the effort 
to maintain and strengthen these relationships and translate reduced threat 
perceptions into substantial military reform still faces a number of obstacles. 
C. REMAINING OBSTACLES TO CLOSER COOPERATION AND MILITARY 
REFORM  
Numerous challenges still confront President Putin in his effort to develop 
a more cooperative security relationship with NATO and the United States.  
These obstacles may limit the success of any attempt to reform the Russian 
armed forces by reinforcing the position that Russia’s security is endangered by 
a threat from the West.   
The conflict in Chechnya is often criticized as a major inhibitor to the 
military reform process.  Demanding the deployment of most of Russia’s elite 
forces, Chechnya continues to consume resources badly needed to rebuild the 
military while the constant guerilla fighting erodes the already low moral of 
Russian troops.  Equally significant is the detrimental effect the conflict has had 
on relations with the West.  Since the bombardment of Grozny in November 
1999, Russia has been criticized for numerous human rights abuses.  These acts 
of brutality simply incite retaliation from Chechens, perpetuate a cycle of 
violence, and result in a mounting number of civilian casualties.132  Moscow’s 
close alignment with the United States and reinvigorated cooperation with NATO 
since 11 September 2001 silenced much of the criticism of Russian conduct.133  
However, as the campaign in Afghanistan comes to a close and the US focus 
shifts toward other regions, the more sympathetic view of Russia’s war against 
Chechen terrorists may begin to evaporate.  The seizure of a Moscow theater by 
Chechen terrorists and the subsequent assault by Russia forces was a 
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demonstration of Putin’s continued inability to find a solution to the conflict.  
Renewed Western criticism of the war in Chechnya could weaken Putin’s effort to 
pursue closer cooperation with NATO and the United States.   
Division over the course of the war on terror could also create a rift in US-
Russian relations.  An example of how this might occur is the recent 
disagreements between Washington and Moscow over the renewed US interest 
in a campaign against Iraq.  Russia’s vision for dealing with Iraq has differed 
significantly from that of the United States and Britain. Putin expressed serious 
reservations about unilateral US military action against Iraq and expressed 
doubts about American evidence claiming the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).134  Russia favored a settlement of the Iraq crisis "through 
political and diplomatic methods based on U.N. Security Council resolutions."135 
Putin supported the return of UN inspectors but stated, “Russia's position has 
always been that no new [UN] resolution [on Iraq] is necessary [.]”136 In October 
2002, Putin’s position began to soften slightly, suggesting that he did “not rule out 
reaching a joint position, including a UN resolution."137  Russia’s opposition 
contributed to the US decision to back away from a unilateral military action 
against Iraq and led to the adoption of a UN resolution that that did not authorize 
immediate military action against Iraq. 
While it ultimately ended in an agreement, the dispute over Iraq 
demonstrated that there are limits to Putin’s willingness to surrender Russia’s 
position as a great power in building a closer ties with the United States.  
Moscow’s insistence on a UN decision prior to any action against Iraq reflects a 
desire to preserve the importance of Russia’s permanent UN Security Council 
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seat.  Should similar disagreements occur in the future, concerns that Russia’s 
geopolitical influence might be marginalized could lead to the deterioration of the 
cooperative relationships built since 11 September 2001.   
Perhaps the most difficult challenge is the anti-Western sentiment that still 
exists in Russia.  Putin’s alignment with the West was pursued despite opposition 
from political and military elites, as well as the Russian public.  According to a 
public opinion poll conducted in September 2001, “54 percent of Russians 
favored neutrality in the conflict between the United States and Islamic terrorists. 
Nearly 70 percent felt that Russia should deny U.S. forces the use of Russian 
bases in Central Asia.”138 Foreign policy analyst Dmitri Trenin commented on 
Putin’s departure from the more commonly held attitudes toward the West:  
Putin clearly has broken with the foreign policy and national 
security bureaucracies, the bulk of which favored a much more 
cautious approach. Many of those people are instinctively anti-
American, and they viewed the terrorist attacks as the product of 
misguided American policies. Now with this truly strategic step, 
Putin has shown he's a true leader, and given the opposition, he 
will need to show a lot of additional leadership to sustain himself in 
that role.139 
 
Putin’s decision was made possible by his personal popularity with the Russian 
public.  Enjoying an approval rating of seventy-five percent, he has been able to 
ignore the opposition to his pro-Western policies.140  Putin has gained the 
“leverage [necessary] to apply more pressure on his ‘recalcitrant’ generals, who 
could be forced to retire or stripped of their pensions if they disagree with the 
new policies.”141   
                                                 




139 Dmitri Trenin, of the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
quoted in Kitfield,  “Putin’s Leap of Faith.” 
 




141 Mizon. “Issues and Analysis: The Treaty of Moscow.” 
 However, as the 2004 Presidential election approaches, Putin may be 
forced to retreat from his pro-Western policies.  Public dissatisfaction with low 
standards of living and declining support for the war in Chechnya could damage 
his popularity.142  Such a situation could force him to once again champion a 
more anti-Western position, tapping into the persisting perceptions among many 
Russians of a threat posed by NATO and the United States.143  Such a shift in 
policy would have a negative impact on Russia’s military reform effort, 
reinvigorating the claims by Russia’s military leaders that large, conscription-
based armed forces, supported by a robust nuclear arsenal, are required to met 
a threat to Russian security from the United States and NATO.  The generals 
could return to claims that military reform is simply too expensive to accomplish 
in an adversarial international security environment.    
While these various factors threaten to weaken President Putin’s effort to 
overcome lingering perceptions of threat from the West, the recent agreements 
with NATO and the United States promise to strengthen their new ties with 
Russia and sustain a more cooperative relationship.  When viewed collectively, 
Putin’s push to overcome the resistance to military reform within the senior ranks 
of the armed forces and his pursuit of a more cooperative relationship with the 
United States and NATO point to a dramatic shift in Russia’s security outlook.  
Minimizing outdated threat perceptions may clear the way for a transformation of 
the military to a design better suited to Russia’s needs in today’s security 
environment. 
                                                 
142 “According to a 2001 survey conducted by the All-Russian Center of Public Opinion Studies 
(VTSIOM), 67 percent of Russians thought that material life in the country had either "not 
changed or declined" during the previous year, and 73 percent said that the level of corruption 
"had stayed the same or grew worse.  … In late 1999, roughly two-thirds of the Russian 
population favored active military operations in Chechnya (including air strikes); but in April 2001, 
only one-third supported the war effort, with 58 percent supporting peace negotiations.” 




































President Putin’s decision to align Russia with the West since 11 
September 2001 may prove to have a dramatic impact on the future evolution of 
Russia’s military.  The resistance to reform within Russia’s military leadership 
has been weakened by Russia’s closer cooperation with NATO and the United 
States.  Claims by Russian generals that threats posed by the West require the 
retention of a large, conscript-based, military structure designed to fight a large-
scale war have become increasingly difficult to support.  Removing this obstacle 
could clear the way for a more dramatic restructuring of the Russian armed 
forces than has occurred thus far. The slow and largely unsuccessful reform 
effort of the 1990’s could now give way to a serious attempt to reorient Russian 
military doctrine and structure to deal with much more threatening security 
challenges in other regions. 
 Ratification of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty by the Russian 
Duma and the US Senate will reduce the pressure on Russia to maintain its large 
strategic nuclear arsenal.  Combined with Putin’s steady effort to increase 
funding for the armed forces, the reduced cost associated with maintaining 
smaller strategic forces will make a greater portion of the Russian defense 
budget available for the spending on conventional forces.144  Increases in 
procurement and R&D will help correct the problems of Russia’s decaying 
conventional military capability.  
 A reformed Russian military could make Russia an increasingly valuable 
partner for NATO and the United States in the future.  Russia’s dominant 
geographic position in Asia will make it a very relevant actor in the region and a 
modern military capable of joint operations with Western forces could be a key 
element in future crises.  Military-to-military consultation institutionalized in the 
NATO-Russia Council could form the foundation of a cooperative effort that helps 
shape Russia’s future military capability.   As NATO deepens its relationship with 
Moscow through the “at twenty” agreement, the Alliance should seek to expand 
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144 Belkin, p. 9. 
its cooperation on military issues.  Likewise, as the American campaign in 
Afghanistan moves into the post-hostilities phase and the war on terror moves to 
other regions, the United States should continue to take advantage of future 
opportunities for military cooperation.  Strengthening these ties will promote 
greater transparency in military issues and encourage the development of joint 
military practices.   
 Despite the benefits a cooperative relationship with the West provides, the 
military reform process still demands a serious commitment by Russia.  While 
reducing threat perceptions can influence Moscow’s decisions on force structure 
and defense spending, and minimize the use of Western military might by 
Russia’s generals as a justification to resist reform, the deeper social issues, 
declining military moral, and transition to a volunteer force requires serious 
commitments.  As long as the war in Chechnya continues to drain military 
resources, meaningful progress on these issues will be difficult.145  As the US 
technological lead widens, it will be increasingly difficult for the Russian military 
to modernize to a level at which it can serve as an effective partner in US-led 
military operations.  Limited civilian oversight leaves conservative elements 
within the military too much latitude in the allocation of scarce financial resources 
and the absence of a comprehensive military reform plan permits inefficient 
practices to continue.146  Putin’s popularity allows him to exercise a greater 
degree of control over the generals, and he has demonstrated a willingness to 
remove senior officers who disagree with his policies.  However, Putin has limited 
political capital and it is unclear if he is willing to expend all of it reigning in the 
generals, and, in turn, risking his own political future. 
 While the future of Russia’s military reform effort remains uncertain, closer 
cooperation with NATO and the United States have produced some promising 
signs.  President Putin recognizes that a strategic partnership with the West is in 
both the short and long-term interests of his country.  Similarly, Washington and 
                                                 




146 Shlykov, “Resource Allocation.” p. 23. 
Brussels should not underestimate the benefits that closer ties with Russia could 
bring in the future.  Historically, Russia has gone through repeated cycles of 
military backwardness, and in every case, it has reemerged as strong military 
power and a prominent actor in international relations.  It would be shortsighted 
to believe that Russia will never recover from its current military difficulties.  Such 
a recovery may take decades to accomplish, but America and the NATO allies 
should seize this opportunity to influence positively the course of military reform.  
It could ultimately lead to the emergence of a potent ally rather than a dangerous 
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